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DCID No. 4/2  
(New Series)

CA-3352  
Transmitted  
DIRECTION OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 4/2

THE DEFECTOR PROGRAM ABROAD

(Effective 20 June 1959)

1. SCOPE

Pursuant to the provisions of NSCIP No. 4, this directive establishes procedures for the inducement, exploitation, resettlement and further handling of defectors outside the continental limits of the United States and its possessions. This directive does not apply in active theaters of war where U.S. Forces are engaged or where the President so directs.

2. DEFINITIONS

For the purpose of this directive, the terms listed below shall have the meanings indicated:

a. *Defectors*: Defectors are defined as nationals of the USSR or a country in the Sino-Soviet Bloc who have escaped from the control of any such country, or who, being outside such jurisdiction and control, are unwilling to return thereto and who are of special value to the U.S. Government because:

(1) They are able to add valuable new or confirmatory information to existing U.S. knowledge of the Soviet world;

(2) They are of operational value to a U.S. department or agency; or

(3) Their defection can be psychologically exploited to the advantage of the United States.

b. *Inducement*: Inducement is an act committed or manifestly instigated by a U.S. official and demonstrably intended to bring about a defection for which the U.S. Government might, if the act were discovered, be called upon to account.

c. *Potential Defector*: A potential defector is a national of the USSR or a country of the Sino-Soviet Bloc who (1) is dissatisfied or potentially estranged in the allegiance to the government of his nationality, (2) may reasonably be expected to be susceptible to defection or recruitment in place, and (3) appears to meet the special values criteria of a defector as set forth in para. 2.a. above.

d. *Disaffected Person*: A disaffected person is a potential defector who, either through inducement or voluntary action on his part, has indicated willingness or desire to defect.

e. *Walk-In*: A walk-in is a disaffected person who presents himself to a U.S. installation in a foreign country and requests asylum or assistance in escaping from Communist control.

f. *Refugee*: A refugee is a national or former national of a Communist-dominated country, who has fled from and/or is unwilling to return

This Directive supersedes DCID No. 4/2 (New Series), dated 29 April 1958, which previously had superseded IDCOP No. 2 (June 1954).

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1

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**SECRET**

to the country of origin, and who has not been integrated into the economy of the country of present residence, and who is not a defector.

**Escapée:** An escapee is a refugee who is a national (1) of a European satellite (except ethnic Germans) or Yugoslavia who has escaped since 1 January 1948, or (2) of the USSR irrespective of the date of his escape, or (3) of Communist China or the Asian satellites on a very selective basis.

**3. NON-SOVIET BLOC NATIONALS**

The provisions of this directive may be applied in whole or in part to cases of nationals of countries other than the USSR or the Sino-Soviet Bloc, who otherwise meet the definition of defectors in para. 2.a. above, when such action is approved by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation with the United States Intelligence Board. Such action is normally recommended by the Interagency Defector Committee (IDC), Washington.

**4. SUMMARY OF U.S. POLICY CONCERNING THE DEFECTOR PROGRAM**

a. Defection, particularly from the USSR, should be encouraged and induced, employing both conventional and unconventional means, whenever there is a net advantage to U.S. interests. Accordingly, the United States should:

(1) Encourage and induce the defection of the maximum number of persons from the USSR and of Soviet nationals outside the USSR.

(2) Continue, and if possible expand, efforts to encourage and induce the defection of key members of elite groups of countries other than the USSR who may qualify as defectors.

b. To encourage defection and discourage redefection, the United States should assure defectors adequate care, maintenance, and resettlement assistance not only during, but also after their exploitation or utilization.

c. The United States should take no action to encourage the departure of large numbers of nationals from countries in the Sino-Soviet Bloc other than the USSR.

d. Prior to initiation by any U.S. department or agency of action to induce defection of a potential defector or disaffected person, the possible value of recruitment in place will be considered carefully. Where the best interest of the United States would be served by such recruitment of the individual concerned, the provisions of DCID No. 5/1 shall apply.

e. It shall be the general policy that no bona fide defector will be returned without his consent.

f. Intelligence considerations and objectives shall take priority and shall be satisfied prior to psychological exploitation of defectors. Psychological exploitation will be restricted to specific cases where a net advantage to the United States can be expected. These policies shall be implemented to the extent practical in cases where a defector is under the control of another government outside the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

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3. Implementation of overt publicity concerning defectors shall be conducted by the Department of State.

4. Coordination, as provided herein, shall respect the interests, capabilities and responsibilities of all departments and agencies to insure full use of such capabilities in support of the defector program.

#### 5. LOCAL DEFECTOR COMMITTEES

a. A local Defector Committee shall be established under the general supervision of the Senior U.S. Representative in appropriate countries. The Committee shall consist of representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Chairman, Department of State, and Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force. The Committee may invite representatives of other departments and agencies to attend its meetings on an ad hoc basis. The local Defector Committee shall:

a. Meet periodically, normally at least once quarterly, to coordinate interagency aspects of the defector program in the area concerned and to promote the full use of the resources and capabilities of the U.S. Government in support of this program. Copies of minutes of all local Defector Committee meetings shall be forwarded through CIA channels to IDC/Washington.

b. Consider and resolve mutual problems including initial consideration of disaffected persons believed to meet the criteria established in para. 2a. above who are nominated by a member. When such problems cannot be resolved by the local committee, the matter shall be referred through CIA channels to IDC/Washington. In such cases representatives of other departments or agencies may communicate directly with their principals in Washington on the subjects involved. If time does not permit referral to IDC/Washington, the matter shall be submitted for decision to the Senior U.S. Representative in the area.

c. Keep IDC/Washington informed concerning each defector, including status of exploitation and termination of the case. Appropriate reports on disaffected persons will be made to IDC/Washington, except when recruitment in place or other operational use is contemplated.

d. Recommend supplemental procedures in consonance with this directive for approval by IDC/Washington as may be required for implementation of the defector program in the area concerned. Such procedures shall (1) provide for appropriate security measures for the personnel and facilities involved in the program, and (2) insure that: (a) at the earliest possible time, information related to imminence of hostilities or immediate threat to the security of a U.S. installation is sought from the disaffected person or walk-in, (b) such information is given immediate dissemination in the field and at the national level with appropriate source attribution and evaluation, and (c) the disaffected person or walk-in is transferred to CIA control at the earliest possible time, together with the clothing, documents and other possessions and the full results of any preliminary debriefing of the individual.

e. Establish local operating procedures to insure that walk-in cases are promptly referred to the proper official of the U.S. installation involved and handled under conditions insuring the maximum possible security for both the individual concerned and local U.S. installations.

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3

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**SECRET**

f. Establishing procedures to insure that all members of the local Defector Committee are kept currently informed on local defector problems as well as applicable U.S. policies and procedures.

g. Recommended in DCI/Washington proposals for surfacing or the release of initial over-embodiment concerning a defector.

**6. OPERATING POLICIES AND PROCEDURES**

a. The treatment received by a potential defector or disaffected person upon first contact with a U.S. official may influence his decision to defect or his future usefulness to the United States. Any query directly or through an intermediary by a potential defector to ascertain the opportunity of admission to the United States or for other assistance for himself and family should be met with a clear indication of the difficulties involved without indicating that the difficulties are insurmountable. Except in cases of recruitment in place, or other operational use, no firm financial or other commitments shall be made until the case has been considered by the local Defector Committee and, in the event movement to the United States is involved, appropriate clearances are obtained from Washington. As early as feasible, each disaffected person should be required to sign a statement indicating that his defection was purely voluntary and that he desires political asylum.

b. The case of any disaffected person or defector in the hands of a non-Sino-Soviet Bloc government that becomes known to any U.S. Government official abroad should be reported promptly to the Chairman of the local Defector Committee who will consult with appropriate members of the Committee and be responsible for taking and coordinating action in the interest of the United States. To the extent feasible, defectors under the control of another government will be exploited in the interest of the U.S. Government as provided herein. It is recognized, however, that political considerations of and agreements with a host government may affect exploitation of defectors under its control.

c. When a defector is to be used for operational purposes and when his identity should be concealed, the Chairman of the local Defector Committee will inform the Committee of the existence — but not the identity — of the defector together with a general statement of his background, area knowledge and field of relative competence. DCID No. 5/1 shall apply to such cases. Efforts shall be made to satisfy intelligence requirements as promptly and completely as possible.

d. Information related to imminence of hostilities or immediate threat to the security of a U.S. installation will be sought at the earliest possible time from disaffected persons.

e. The establishment of bona fides of disaffected persons will be given particular attention because of the demonstrated use of defector channels by hostile services to penetrate and convey false or deceptive information to U.S. intelligence services.

**7. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIELD REPRESENTATIVE OF CIA**

The Field Representative of CIA has primary responsibility for the conduct of the defector program abroad and for providing certain services of common concern. He shall:

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a. Conducted, as the designated representative of the Director of Central Intelligence, all defector activities conducted within his area of responsibility including:

- (1) Liaison with the intelligence and security services or other interested elements of foreign governments on defector matters;
- (2) Promotion of the full use of the resources and capabilities of all departments and agencies in support of this program;
- (3) Inducement operations and operational use of defectors by other departments and agencies in accordance with the provisions of DCID No. 5/1.

b. In consultation with the local Defector Committee:

(1) Determine, in the case of disaffected persons, the special values, applicable and the risk, if any, to the political, military, diplomatic and security interests of the United States.

(2) Insure appropriate and prompt dissemination of intelligence information obtained from defectors, and

(3) Determine such special handling techniques, including restriction of local dissemination of information, as may be required in cases of disaffected persons or defectors when exceptional political, military, diplomatic, security or other factors are involved. In appropriate cases, recommendations for special handling will be sent to IDC/Washington.

c. Induce defection and use defectors operationally.

d. Establish the bona fides of disaffected persons in consultation with the representatives of appropriate departments or agencies who may have participated in the identification or delivery of the disaffected person, or for other reasons may have a special interest or capability in the area.

(1) Representatives of departments and agencies concerned will be kept informed on a timely basis during the process of determining bona fides and will be provided a final summary when bona fides and special values are established. At such time, departments and agencies concerned will be provided access, initially to satisfy security or other operational intelligence requirements and thereafter for other exploitation purposes.

(2) Information indicating imminence of hostilities or other highly significant intelligence information of immediate interest will be sought at the earliest opportunity and given immediate dissemination in the field and at the national level. Debriefing of defectors to obtain intelligence information of immediate operational value will be conducted in conjunction with other departments and agencies concerned; specific operational leads, applicable to their clandestine activities, will be made available to appropriate departments and agencies.

(3) When the bona fides of a disaffected person cannot be established within a reasonable time, the other members of the local Defector Committee will be given a situation report on the disaffected person together with a general statement of his alleged background,

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5

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own knowledge and field of relative competence. Specific intelligence requirements will be processed and satisfied as promptly and fully as possible, normally with direct access to the disaffected person by the departments and agencies concerned under conditions established by the CIA representative in the light of the unusual circumstances of the case.

(4) When counter-espionage operational action is indicated because hostile agent status is established or must be assumed, the provisions of this directive shall not apply and the case shall be handled in accordance with DCID No. 5/1. When counter-espionage action is not indicated, and prior to disposal of such cases, departments and agencies will be provided an opportunity to request the servicing of specific requirements under conditions established by the CIA representative, normally by direct access to the disaffected person.

e. Inform the Senior U.S. Representative in the area involved of the presence of a defector or potential defector and advise such representative on all aspects of defector matters.

f. Debrief defectors for positive intelligence information with participation by departments and agencies involved in the defector program.

g. Provide or arrange for secure facilities and personnel for the processing and debriefing of defectors including transportation or evacuation to secure areas as required.

h. Provide or arrange for care, maintenance, rehabilitation and resettlement of defectors within the limits of available funds.

i. Serve as the channel of communication between the local Defector Committee and IDG/Washington.

j. Conduct liaison with foreign intelligence and security services concerning defector matters including the exchange of interrogation reports.

**8. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIELD REPRESENTATIVES OF THE DEPARTMENTS OF STATE, ARMY, NAVY AND AIR FORCE**

Designated representatives of the Departments of State, Army, Navy and Air Force:

a. Subject to the provisions of para. 7.a. above, may conduct supplemental activities in support of the defector program including the inducement of defection, liaison with foreign intelligence and security services concerning defector matters, and exchange of their own interrogation reports.

b. Shall report promptly to CIA representatives the identity of any potential defector together with all available pertinent information.

c. Shall provide, within their capabilities, transportation, housing, personnel and other facilities in support of the defector program.

d. Shall advise the representative of the Director of Central Intelligence of the political, military, diplomatic, or security implications of actions proposed or taken in support of this program.

**9. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE SENIOR U.S. REPRESENTATIVE IN THE AREA**

The Senior U.S. Representative in the area concerned will be responsible for:

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a. Determining, with the advice and recommendation of the representative of the Director of Central Intelligence, the number and degree to which actions contemplated toward a suspected person or defector may affect the political and diplomatic interest of the U.S.

b. Insuring that appropriate U.S. officials, not covered by para. 5.f., who are likely to be in contact with disaffected persons are given limited briefing concerning defector matters as provided herein.

c. Coordinating with the representatives of interested U.S. Departments and agencies and, to the degree necessary, with appropriate foreign governmental agencies, any publicity or psychological exploitation of a defector.

d. Providing assistance to the CIA representative in carrying out his responsibilities under this directive.

ALLEN W. DULLES  
Director of Central Intelligence

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7

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 4/2<sup>1</sup>

THE DEFECTOR PROGRAM ABROAD

(Effective 26 June 1959)

1. *SCOPE*

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- (1) They are able to add valuable new or confirmatory information to existing U.S. knowledge of the Soviet World;
- (2) They are of operational value to a U.S. department or agency;
- or
- (3) Their defection can be psychologically exploited to the advantage of the United States.

b. *Inducement*: inducement is an act committed or manifestly instigated by a U.S. official and demonstrably intended to bring about a defection for which the U.S. Government might, if the act were discovered, be called upon to account.

c. *Potential Defector*: A potential defector is a national of the USSR or a country of the Sino-Soviet Bloc who (1) is dissatisfied or potentially estranged in the allegiance to the government of his nationality, (2) may reasonably be expected to be susceptible to defection or recruitment in place, and (3) appears to meet the special values criteria of a defector as set forth in para. 2.a. above.

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e. *Walk-In*: A walk-in is a disaffected person who presents himself to a U.S. installation in a foreign country and requests asylum or assistance in escaping from Communist control.

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TSC 030574

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to such country, does not possess another citizenship, has not been integrated into the economy of the country of present residence, and who is not a defector.

g. *Escapee*: An escapee is a refugee who is a national (1) of a European satellite (except ethnic Germans) or Yugoslavia who has escaped since 1 January 1948, or (2) of the USSR irrespective of the date of his escape, or (3) of Communist China or the Asian satellites on a very selective basis.

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4. *SUMMARY OF U.S. POLICY CONCERNING THE DEFECTOR PROGRAM*

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(2) Continue, and if possible expand, efforts to encourage and induce the defection of key members of elite groups of countries other than the USSR who may qualify as defectors.

b. To encourage defection and discourage redefection, the United States should assure defectors adequate care, maintenance, and resettlement assistance not only during, but also after their exploitation or utilization.

c. The United States should take no action to encourage the departure of large numbers of nationals from countries in the Sino-Soviet Bloc other than the USSR.

d. Prior to initiation by any U.S. department or agency of action to induce defection of a potential defector or disaffected person, the possible value of recruitment in place will be considered carefully. Where the best interest of the United States would be served by such recruitment of the individual concerned; the provisions of DCID No. 5/1 shall apply.

e. It shall be the general policy that no bona fide will be returned without his consent.

f. Intelligence considerations and objectives shall take priority and shall be satisfied prior to psychological exploitation of defectors. Psychological exploitation will be restricted to specific cases where a net advantage to the United States can be expected. These policies shall be implemented to the extent practical in cases where a defector is under the control of another government outside the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

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g. Implementation of overt publicity concerning defectors shall be coordinated with the Department of State.

h. Coordination, as provided herein, shall respect the interests, capabilities and responsibilities of all departments and agencies to insure full use of such capabilities in support of the defector program.

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b. Consider and resolve mutual problems including initial consideration of disaffected persons believed to meet the criteria established in para. 2.a. above who are nominated by a member. When such problems cannot be resolved by the local committee, the matter shall be referred through CIA channels to IDC/Washington. In such cases representatives of other departments or agencies may communicate directly with their principles in Washington on the subjects involved. If time does not permit referral to IDC/Washington, the matter shall be submitted for decision to the Senior U.S. Representative in the area.

c. Keep IDC/Washington informed concerning each defector, including status of exploitation and termination of the case. Appropriate reports on disaffected persons will be made to IDC/Washington, except when recruitment in place or other operational use is contemplated.

d. Recommend supplemental procedures in consonance with this directive for approval by IDC/Washington as may be required for implementation of the defector program in the area concerned. Such procedures shall (1) provide for appropriate security measures for the personnel and facilities involved in the program, and (2) insure that: (a) at the earliest possible time, information related to imminence of hostilities or immediate threat to the security of a U.S. installation is sought from the disaffected person or walk-in, (b) such information is given immediate dissemination in the field and at the national level with appropriate source attribution and evaluation, and (c) the disaffected person or walk-in is transferred to CIA control at the earliest possible time, together with the clothing, documents and other possessions and the full results of any preliminary debriefing of the individual.

e. Establish local operating procedures to insure that walk-in cases are promptly referred to the proper official of the U.S. installation involved and handled under conditions insuring the maximum possible security for both the individual concerned and local U.S. installations.

TSC 030574

SECRET

f. Establish procedures to insure that all members of the local Defector Committee are kept currently informed on local defector problems as well as applicable U.S. policies and procedures.

g. Recommend to IDC/Washington proposals for surfacing or the release of initial overt publicity concerning a defector.

6. *OPERATING POLICIES AND PROCEDURES*

a. The treatment received by a potential defector or disaffected person upon first contact with a U.S. official may influence his decision to defect or his future usefulness to the United States. Any query directly or through an intermediary by a potential defector to ascertain the opportunity of admission to the United States or for other assistance for himself and family should be met with a clear indication of the difficulties involved without indicating that the difficulties are insurmountable. Except in cases of recruitment in place, or other operational use, no firm financial or other commitments shall be made until the case has been considered by the local Defector Committee and, in the event movement to the United States is involved, appropriate clearances are obtained from Washington. As early as feasible, each disaffected person should be required to sign a statement indicating that his defection was purely voluntary and that he desires political asylum.

b. The case of any disaffected person or defector in the hands of a non-Sino-Soviet Bloc government that becomes known to any U.S. Government official abroad should be reported promptly to the Chairman of the local Defector Committee who will consult with appropriate members of the Committee and be responsible for taking and coordinating action in the interest of the United States. To the extent feasible, defectors under the control of another government will be exploited in the interest of the U.S. Government as provided herein. It is recognized, however, that political considerations of and agreements with a host government may affect exploitation of defectors under its control.

c. When a defector is to be used for operational purposes and when his identity should be concealed, the Chairman of the local Defector Committee will inform the Committee of the existence-but not the identity-of the defector together with a general statement of his background, area knowledge and field of relative competence. DCID No. 5/1 shall apply to such cases. Efforts shall be made to satisfy intelligence requirements as promptly and completely as possible.

d. Information related to imminence of hostilities or immediate threat to the security of a U.S. installation will be sought at the earliest possible time from disaffected persons.

e. The establishment of bona fides of disaffected persons will be given particular attention because of the demonstrated use of defector channels by hostile services to penetrate and convey false or deceptive information to U.S. intelligence services.

7. *RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIELD REPRESENTATIVE OF CIA*

The Field Representative of CIA has primary responsibility for the conduct of the defector program abroad and for providing certain services of common concern. He shall:

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a. Coordinate as the designated representative of the Director of Central Intelligence, all defector activities conducted within the area of responsibility including:

- (1) Liaison with the intelligence and security services of other interested elements of foreign governments on defector matters,
- (2) Promotion of the full use of the resources and capabilities of all departments and agencies in support of this program,
- (3) Inducement operations and operational use of defectors by other departments and agencies in accordance with the provisions of DCID No. 5/1.

b. In consultation with the local Defector Committee:

- (1) Determine, in the case of disaffected persons, the special values applicable and the risk, if any, to the political, military, diplomatic and security interests of the United States.
- (2) Insure appropriate and prompt dissemination of intelligence information obtained from defectors, and
- (3) Determine such special handling techniques, including restriction of local dissemination of information, as may be required in cases of disaffected persons or defectors when exceptional political, military, diplomatic, security or other factors are involved. In appropriate cases, recommendations for special handling will be sent to IDC/Washington.

c. Induce defection and use defectors operationally.

d. Establish the bona fides of disaffected persons in consultation with the representatives of appropriate departments or agencies who may have participated in the identification or delivery of the disaffected person, or for other reasons may have a special interest or capability in the area.

(1) Representatives of departments and agencies concerned will be kept informed on a timely basis during the process of determining bona fides and will be provided a final summary when bona fides and special values are established. At such time, departments and agencies concerned will be provided access, initially to satisfy security or other operational intelligence requirements and thereafter for other exploitation purposes.

(2) Information indicating imminence of hostilities or other highly significant intelligence information of immediate interest will be sought at the earliest opportunity and given immediate dissemination in the field and at the national level. Debriefing of defectors to obtain intelligence information of immediate operational value will be conducted in conjunction with other departments and agencies concerned; specific operational loads, applicable to their clandestine activities, will be made available to appropriate departments and agencies.

(3) When the bona fides of a disaffected person cannot be established within a reasonable time, the other members of the local Defector Committee will be given a situation report on the disaffected person together with a general statement of his alleged background,

TSC 030574

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area knowledge and field of relative competence. Specific intelligence requirements will be produced and satisfied as promptly and fully as possible, normally with direct access to the disaffected person by the departments or agencies concerned under conditions established by the CIA representative in the light of the unusual circumstances of the case.

(4) When counter-espionage operational action is indicated because hostile agent status is established or must be assumed, the provisions of this directive shall not apply and the case shall be handled in accordance with DCID No. 5/1. When counter-espionage action is not indicated, and prior to disposal of such cases, departments and agencies will be provided an opportunity to request the servicing of specific requirements under conditions established by the CIA representative, normally by direct access to the disaffected person.

e. Inform the Senior U.S. Representative in the area involved of the presence of a defector or potential defector and advise such representative on all aspects of defector matters.

f. Debrief defectors for positive intelligence information with participation by departments and agencies involved in the defector program.

g. Provide or arrange for care, maintenance, rehabilitation and resettlement of defectors within the limits of available funds.

i. Serve as the channel of communication between the local Defector Committee and IDC/Washington.

j. Conduct liaison with foreign intelligence and security services concerning defector matters including the exchange of interrogation reports.

8. *RESPONSIBILITY OF THE FIELD REPRESENTATIVES OF THE DEPARTMENTS OF STATE, ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR FORCE*

Designated representatives of the Departments of State, Army, Navy and Air Force:

a. Subject to the provisions of para.7.a. above, may conduct supplemental activities in support of the defector program including the inducement of defection, liaison with foreign intelligence and security services concerning defector matters, and exchange of their own interrogation reports.

b. Shall report promptly to CIA representatives the identity of any potential defector together with all available pertinent information.

c. Shall provide, within their capabilities, transportation, housing, personnel and other facilities in support of the defector program.

d. Shall advise the representative of the Director of Central Intelligence of the political, military, diplomatic, or security implications of actions proposed or taken in support of this program.

9. *RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE SENIOR U.S. REPRESENTATIVE IN THE AREA*

The Senior U.S. Representative in the area concerned will be responsible for:

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a. Determining with the advice and recommendation of the representative of the Director of Central Intelligence, the manner and degree to which actions contemplated toward a disaffected person or defector may affect the political and diplomatic interest of the U.S.

b. Insuring that appropriate U.S. officials, not covered by para 5.f., who are likely to be in contact with disaffected persons are given limited briefing concerning defector matters as provided herein.

c. Coordinating with the representatives of interested U.S. departments and agencies and, to the degree necessary, with appropriate foreign governmental agencies, any publicity or psychological exploitation of a defector.

d. Providing assistance to the CIA representative in carrying out his responsibilities under this directive.

ALLEN W. DULLES  
Director of Central Intelligence

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